Integralism, Political Catholicism, and Democracy in the West

Within the Emerging Ecosystem of Illiberal Thought

In this post I will introduce and expound upon an essay entitled “Integralism, Political Catholicism, and Democracy in the Modern West,” which was written by Julian G. Waller and is included in Social Catholicism for the 21st Century? Volume 1: Historical Perspectives and Constitutional Democracy in Peril.

[Medieval Illustration of Two Swords, Wikipedia]

As indicated by the title, Waller introduces the topic of integralism or neo-integralism, sketches how this relates to different forms of political Catholicism, and then reflects upon how it pertains to the state of democracy in the West. Rather than focusing on the theological-political claims of integralism, or whether it is a “Trojan Horse” for political authoritarianism, Waller focuses on locating neo-integralism within the context of the broader intellectual ecosystem of the Anglo-American illiberal right in which it is located. In particular, he treats integralism as

…part of a broader intellectual movement of political reaction that cross-pollinates with diverse streams of ideational thought discontented with the contemporary social and political order found in the West and can be understood in these terms with greater analytic leverage when placed in an appropriate, ideological context.

Integralism and Neo-Integralism

To provide a “definitional baseline,” Waller surveys some of the most common definitions of integralism. Key elements of these definitions include the claims that “the temporal power must be subordinated to the spiritual power,” that society must reflect the “Social Kingship of Christ” which upholds “the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ” (326), and that a proper socio-political order opposes “liberalism in all of its forms” (327).

Although the figures who explicitly embrace integralism are relatively few, their influence is multiplied through “a clear, networked relation to others working in the conservative legal field, in online conservative or ‘reactionary’ politics and postliberal writing, and in the broader world of right-wing political Catholicism” (327).

Waller writes that “…the burgeoning contemporary political philosophy that is modern integralism and its familial ideologies is at a minimum a political-theological program that seeks to reorient political and state power towards a (Catholic) conception of the common good and away from the assumptions and practices of political liberalism in Western societies” (327).

I would add that this allegedly Catholic understanding of the common good does not follow the definition that has predominated in Catholic Social Doctrine (CSD) since at least St. John XXIII, and prefigured in generations of moral manuals. This was “‘the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfilment more fully and more easily.’”¹ Instead, integralist understandings of the common good tend to reflect earlier threads of the tradition before the emergence of the “social question” in the wake of the industrial revolution required further development of the Church’s understanding of it, and of our corresponding social doctrine. This truncated understanding of the common good traces to the socially conservative identity of these Catholics which separates them from the last several decades of CSD.

Neo-integralism is also a program of action, one that is deeply illiberal but with differing goals and emphases. For some of the more radical proponents who focus on political structures, this program of action means promoting a confessional and even monarchial state. For others, the program centers on diagnosing social ills, which leads—for example—to criticizing the rise of the “professional-managerial class and the libertarian capture of conservative institutions” (328).

Integralism and the Illiberal Intellectual Ecosystem

Waller argues that the “specific claims of integralism are in some ways less relevant than the ideational company with which it has found itself,” especially in the years since about 2010 and the financial crisis. This company is based less on any shared positive program than in illiberalism, a shared opposition to modern liberalism, which is charged with being hegemonic. Within this illiberal ecosystem, neo-integralism functions as a point of reference for Catholics. It not only rejects liberalism, but brings “an entire philosophical architecture, one that also asserts full orthodoxy and fittingness with the Catholic Church” (330).

I would add, however, that it asserts this in an explicit departure from the last eighty years of Catholic Social Doctrine as understood by the magisterium, which raises serious questions regarding the sense in which it can be considered orthodox or Catholic.

Waller also notes a wide range of academic projects that are at least adjacent to neo-integralism. These include the postliberal politics advocated by various thinkers, the common good constitutionalism of Adrian Vermeule, the reactionary feminism of Mary Harrington, and the decentralized localism of Patrick Deneen and Chad Pecknold. These adjacent projects agree on the destructive cultural tendencies of liberalism and that the state should promote good things like, for example, family friendly policies. Whereas Vermeule’s common good constitutionalism has inspired lively criticisms, Waller notes that there are others who are more sanguine about its prospects, such as those who would reasonably employ it for environmental legislation.

Still others are concerned about how Vermeule’s legal theory relates to his enthusiasm for a combination of the administrative state and Catholic integralism. Given the broad consensus among illiberal Republicans for taking Hungarian strongman Victor Orbán’s “illiberal democracy” as a model for the United States, it would seem that Vermeule’s combination of integralism, natural law, and the use of the administrative state to coerce obedience to it, would provide significant intellectual support for illiberal conservative Catholics to join in such a political project.

Integralism and Models of Political Catholicism

Given that neo-integralism now provides a Catholic point of reference within a broader ecosystem of illiberal thought, it now also provides what Waller describes as “a touchstone for a new generation of ‘political Catholicism’ confronting the challenges of the age” (337). He also observes that the emerging political Catholicism centered in integralism “benefits from the lack of alternative supply at the level of intellectuals.”

Excursus: Political Integralism or Social Catholicism?

If I understand Waller’s last point correctly, he is referring to the fact that no alternative form of contemporary political Catholicism has arisen to rival what we might call “political integralism,” which is an important observation for the contemporary Church and nation. How has this political integralism emerged from contemporary American Catholicism and why is there no comparative social Catholicism that better aligns with Catholic Social Doctrine?

These are complex questions to be pondered and argued over the years. I think the emergence of political integralism needs to be understood in light of the intellectual foundations undergirding it, the institutions that have supported it, the broader cultural factors and developments that have provided an audience for it, and the financial and power elites who have helped to fund it. The lack of a comparative social Catholicism, on the other hand, is explained by factors including inadequate intellectual work to undergird it, a lack of institutional support for doing so, cultural factors that have been inopportune for its development or that have not been engaged successfully, and a dearth of funding.

My hope is that the time following the election will be more conducive to rejecting illiberal democracy and joining in broad coalitions—guided by the integral and solidary humanism of Catholic Social Doctrine—to renew our democracy to meet the great challenges of our century.

Returning to Waller’s essay, he rightly suggests we need understand this new era of political Catholicism centered in integralism in comparison with that of other ages. He notes how, earlier in the twentieth century, political Catholicism was often centered in the Catholic Action movement. For much of the century, moreover, political Catholicism was in the forefront of opposing communism, although before the Second World War this often meant supporting fascists and opposing liberal democracy, as I may discuss in a future post. As we saw in a previous post about Action Française (AF) under the influence of Charles Maurras, such efforts in France were tinged by nationalism, monarchism and proto-fascism.

In Austria, on the other hand, Waller discusses how Catholic Action was distinct from authoritarianism and was a locus of resistance to the Fatherland Front. After the Second Vatican Council, what we could call political Catholicism advanced human rights and democracy in many places. In more recent decades in the United State, a version of political Catholicism has emphasized a more limited set of pro-life issues as part of a culturally conservative alliance with Evangelical Protestants in the Republican party. Waller observes that—in recent decades—the sexual abuse scandal has undermined the prospects for Catholics being a credible source of political engagement. If American Catholics do not make a prompt course correction—from the path of political integralism in alliance with a Republican party seeking illiberal democracy to the authentic social doctrine of the Church—I fear we risk doing even worse damage to the reputation of the Church.

Waller astutely observes that “integralism provides a Church-compliant alternative to breakaway insubordination that is attractive to some elite conservative Catholics” (338), offering them an alternative to moving further “on the path of semi-schism” (339). Such Catholics can certainly argue that their views are “deeply drawn from Leonine and Neo-Thomistic thought…” (338). They also claim “adherence to the institutional reforms of the post-conciliar Church” (338) and “that this is simply what the Church has always taught…” (339), but I think such views are indefensible. Waller astutely observes, on the other hand, that the prospects for integralism providing a model of political engagement for Catholics is real, especially for highly-educated, conservative Catholics in the United States.

Waller also sees a de facto evolution toward the term integralism—including soft, moderate, and hard forms—as “a broad term encompassing conservative forms of Catholic politics [as] well on its way” (339). Assuming he is correct, this embrace of integralism by especially elite conservative Catholics in the United States has serious implications both ad intra and ad extra. Ad intra, it means that some of the most prolific contemporary Catholics are at least implicitly arguing that the fraternal and humanistic stance of Catholic Social Doctrine that emerged out of the early twentieth century experience with fascism was mistaken, or at least is obsolete.

Ad extra, Waller next discusses the relevance of this integralist consensus among elite conservative Catholics to democracy in the modern West.

Integralism and Democracy in the Modern West

It seems clear that strong forms of integralism, “if fully accepted by a political society, would lead to a sort of authoritarian regime,” an impression that is confirmed by the historical analogies such as Catholic monarchy and Roman imperium (340). Although the “integralist vision is a direct challenge to liberal-pluralist interpretations of democratic governance” (340), Waller notes that it could be reconciled with “minimalist conceptions” of “electoral democracy” (341).

On the other hand, “[t]he manualist integralist writing, ‘lauds the mixed regime found in Aristotelian-Thomistic thought, but is certainly ambivalent about whether the ideal mixed regime would be recognizable as a modern electoral democracy.’” Integralist Alan Fimister, for example, affirms that the United States can be seen as “a well-ordered Republic” (342). Waller calmly notes that even if contemporary integralists disavow the authoritarian nationalism of prewar integralists—whether in France, Brazil, Argentina, or Spain—these historical precedents are at least a complication for them. He also generously allows that the “more practical form [of integralism] as a type of motivating political Catholicism likely does not” entail theocracy and observes that the “Church’s midcentury peace with democratic forms of government also loom large in and around integralist debates” (344). Indeed, I would argue that the postwar reconciliation of Catholicism with constitutional democracy after the disastrous experience with fascist regimes during the interwar years was a decisive recognition of what conforms best with core teachings of the faith and is not reformable, nor is the recognition that authoritarian regimes are incompatible with the faith.

Concluding Remarks

By focusing on the intellectual ecosystem within which Catholic neo-integralism is located, Waller offers an excellent overview of the intellectual terrain while bracketing the more complex questions of adjudicating integralist claims of theological orthodoxy, or whether integralism is a Trojan Horse for authoritarianism. There is wisdom in recognizing that these matters are inherently complex, that the scholars advocating integralism and adjacent projects are erudite, that few have time to carefully study the vast literature, and that everyone deserves a charitable reading and the presumption of good will.

On the other hand, American democracy, the postwar liberal order, the future of Ukraine and perhaps neighboring states, and any reasonable hope of addressing the climate crisis are all apparently “on the ballot” in an election of arguably unrivaled importance. At such a time, Waller has discussed the prominent place that integralism—and the closely related illiberalism—has gained among especially intellectually-engaged conservative Catholics. I would argue that this group includes much of what I call the “institutional infrastructure” of the Catholic Church in the United States, including many clergy, seminarians, academics, journalists, and Church employees, who help to shape the views of the most regularly practicing Catholics.

Perhaps it is due to my ignorance, but I do not see how one could reconcile such socially-conservative illiberalism with Catholic Social Doctrine, especially as it was synthesized during the pontificate of St. John Paul II in the 2004 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. Nor do I see how to reconcile it with the social teaching of Pope Benedict XVI or Francis, both of which should be read—in my opinion—as organic developments of the tradition of the modern social encyclicals, which strive for fidelity to the broader Tradition tracing back to the Old Testament. Nor do I see how to reconcile integralism or illiberalism with the tradition of social Catholicism that has lived out what the Compendium describes as an “integral and solidary humanism,” collaborating broadly for the common good, even with those of differing views on deeply held matters of faith and morals.

On the contrary, as I hope to discuss in forthcoming posts, a socially-conservative and illiberal political stance in our contemporary context risks putting Catholics in a de facto political alliance with a frightening cast of characters, repeating a tragic mistake made in Weimar Germany.

As I have begun to argue in not only Social Catholicism for the Twenty First Century? but also in previous posts to this substack, the model of social Catholicism provides a way for Catholics to enter into the broad efforts to work in solidarity to build a future worthy of the human family. This “better kind of politics” reflects the wisdom the Church has gained from our previous experience with illiberalism and integralism, which sadly entangled Catholics in alliances with fascists in Europe as we saw in previous posts.

My hope and prayer is that there will be a new openness among Catholics for the authentic Social Doctrine of the Church in the upcoming months so that we can realize the great promise of the Second Vatican Council of the Church as “a sacrament or as a sign and instrument both of a very closely knit union with God and of the unity of the whole human race” (Lumen gentium no. 1).

1. This citation is from no. 164 of the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, which cites the Second Vatican Council’s Gaudium et spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, which cites St. John XXIII’s encyclicals, which aligns with generations of moral manuals.